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In the constitutional case of Gong Lum v. Rice (1927), the United States 
Supreme Court, composed entirely of Bok Guey (whites), adjudged Hon Yen 
(Chinese) to be in the same social classification as Lo Mok (blacks). 1 The case, 
which pertained to "racially" segregated schools, reveals the problematic of law, 
race, and ethnicity. 
The Supreme Court ' s  decision permitted the state of Mississippi to define 
Martha Lum, a Chinese American, as a member of the "colored races" so that 
"white" schools could remain segregated. The essential meaning of American 
ethnicity was, to a large degree, revealed by this convergence of law and race as 
ideological constructs reflecting real social relations in the second decade of the 
twentieth century. 
This paper will attempt to explicate this convergence in examining Gong Lum 
v. Rice by using critical legal theory.2 The four basic concepts within critical 
legal theory are: 
1. Legal ideology and legal institutions reflect the material interests of the 
dominating classes . 
2. Ideological forms and/or juridic concepts express the consciousness and 
world view of those whose hands are on the controls of the "blind insensate 
machine of law."3 
3. The ideological form helps in the structuring of mass consciousness, helps 
in reproducing social relationships and their material base, while simultaneously 
obscuring society' s  true formation. 
4. Law functions within the Gramscian concept of hegemony-that it is a 
relatively autonomous ideological form which functions to lessen and dilute 
social antagonisms by "assuring people that their particular conscience can be 
subordinated, must be subordinated, to the collective judgement of society."4 
Antonio Gramsci, the noted Italian social theorist, developed the idea of 
hegemony to explain how domination is maintained, in part, by the ideology of 
law . For Gramsci, the law legitimates coercive society by veiling the fact that 
coercion exists at all. The law does this by persuading mass society that 
"individual rights" within the structure of "formal legal equality" hold out 
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"justice" as an end result of the "procedural rights" of due process while actually 
maintaining the status quo of inequality with the indeterminacy of judge-made 
decisions. The impression that these decisions are made by a neutral, autonomous, 
judicial "oracle" gives the mass society the illusion that such mediatory processes 
are the best that one can hope for in alleviating an unjust situation. The 
hegemonic function of the law can be clearly seen when racial antagonism is 
mediated by "closeted" white racist justices who hide their racism behind the 
"objective deliberative" process of a court hearing and neutral principles of law 
that are interpreted to maintain white domination over black, or over brown, 
yellow, or red. Legitimation and the lessening of racial antagonism have 
occurred when the "losers" return to their communities to await the next 
opportunity to litigate another "test case" so that their formal rights will, one day, 
be recognized by law's "majestic rights consciousness." 
The concept of hegemony as well as the other dimensions of critical legal 
theory are recognizable variables in the case involving Martha Lum and the state 
of Mississippi . Separate, but never equal , as established by Southern "state 
rights" legislative activity following the validating 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson 
decision, was the precedent that Chief Justice William Howard Taft, speaking for 
an unanimous Court, used against Martha Lum in his decision: 
This case then reduces itself to the question of whether a state 
can be said to afford a child of Chinese ancestry born in this 
country, and citizen of the United States, the equal protection 
of the laws by the opportunity for a common school education 
in a school which receives only colored children of the brown,  
yellow or  black races . . .  we think that i t  i s  the same question 
which has been many times decided to be within the 
constitutional power of the state legislature to settle without 
intervention of the federal courts under the Federal Constitu­
tion.s 
"The Lotuses Among the Magnolias"6 responded to this decision by creating 
their own schools with their own Chinese American teachers. This was done to 
secure their ethnic identity, to prevent their children from attending the black 
schools of inferior quality, and to maintain their interstitial niche, via 
accomodationism, between the ruling whites and the servile class composed of 
African Americans. 
This case and the Mississippi Chinese 's  response reveal problems in the 
universal applicability of critical legal theory but also demonstrate its utility. The 
case demonstrates that: 1) legal ideology, i .e . ,  federalism, supported the world 
view and interests of the Southern ruling class in keeping with the infamous 
Compromise of 1877; 2) separate but equal was an ideological form that helped 
solidify the material basis of society but could not obscure its reality; and 3) law 
did not function within Gramscian hegemony in structuring a social formation 
which legitimated classifications of color, race, and ethnicity as defined by those 
whose hands were on the sensate machine of law because the Chinese saw 
through the legal veil. 
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Applying critical legal studies to history is highly problematic. The problems 
of interpreting and bringing meaning to human political activity can be a 
researcher's most difficult task. However, much of twentieth century race 
relations can be explicated by examining the consequential history of Recon­
struction and how racialistic federalism evolved. This development ultimately 
led to Martha Lum and to a confirmation of the fruitfulness of using this theory, 
adjusting for its limitations, as a tool of historical analysis. 
If the Civil War was the "irrepressible conflict, " then the Compromise of 
1877 could be rightly termed the inevitable reconciliation. The contradictions 
within America's capitalist and slave economies had brought about the Civil 
War. It would be the American philosophical belief in white supremacy that 
would bring about "Reunion " under a racialistic federalism. 
The events that led to the Compromise were brought about by the determination 
of white Southerners to maintain their way of life .  They resorted to a type of 
guerrilla warfare which included fraud, intimidation, and murder to re-establish 
their own control over the state governments, which were then in the hands of 
black Republicans, Northern carpetbaggers, and Southern scalawags. The 
implementation of "nigra legislation" by the federal government made the South 
even more determined to resist. They saw the 1 3th, 14th, and 15th Amendments 
and subsequent civil rights statutes as the main threat to the Southern status quo 
of black subserviency and white supremacy. This threat was exacerbated in 
states such as South Carolina, Mississippi , and Louisiana, where the freedman 
was densely populated, and in some "Black Belt" counties where they were in 
the majority. 
But the crucial factor that brought about the Compromise was the reality that 
many Northern whites, prior to the Civil War, went along with their Southern 
counterparts in looking upon peoples of African descent as an inferior race 
doomed to the lowest position in white "civilized" society. This is the fundamental 
reason why racialist federalism could develop as a result of the Compromise of 
1 877. Before the Civil War, many Northern states had preventive statutes on the 
quasi-free African ' s  right to vote. Jim Crow existed as a de facto norm in 
Northern society in the years preceding the Civil War. The Northern "Negro" 
was segregated from the cradle to the grave.? The Compromise of 1877, between 
the Republican and Democratic parties,  was precipitated by the disputed Hayes­
Tilden presidential election of 1 876. Through a series of quasi-secret meetings 
and discussions, known as the "Wormley Bargain," the parties negotiated 
reciprocal promises. 8 
This white supremacist rapprochement rested on Northern promises and 
Southern hopes.  On March 2, 1877, Hayes was formally announced the winner 
of the presidential election . Within a short period, Hayes withdrew the federal 
troops and put an official end to Radical Reconstruction. He also appointed 
Senator David Key of Tennessee as Postmaster General. But other hopes and 
promises went unfulfilled. Southerners did not deliver enough votes to elect the 
Republican James A. Garfield as the Speaker of the House, and the Republicans 
did not deliver enough votes to pass the promised Texas and Pacific Railroad bill . 
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In the end, the North resigned political control of the South (racialistic federal­
ism) to the Democratic party while retaining for itself control of national 
economic policies.9 
The role of law (constitutional and "lynch ") and the Supreme Court were vital 
in making the Compromise effective. One basic assumption of critical legal 
theory is that legal ideology, in this case federalism, supports the world view and 
interests of ruling classes. On its face the concept of federalism seeks, as a check 
and as a balance, to restrain power aggrandizement. Power is divided between 
state and national government. The convergence of legal ideology and racial 
ideology which supported the world view and interests of the white ruling classes 
of both North and South can be clearly demonstrated by examining the Supreme 
Court cases that laid the judicial precedents for Gong Lum v. Rice. The Supreme 
Court decisions in the Slaughter House Cases (1872), US v. CruikshankD 875), 
Virginia v. Reeves (1880), Pace v. Alabama (1882), US v. Harris (1883), 
Cumming v. County Board of Education (1889), Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), and 
Berea College v. Kentucky (1908)10 solidified a type of racial federalism that 
permitted the North to rid itself of the "Negro Question " by giving the South 
states rights powers which it used to reduce the African American: 
to a despairing second-class citizenship: voteless in the South; 
helpless in the face of constant and brutal aggression; indicted 
by all white grand juries and convicted by all-white trial juries ;  
denied access to places of public accommodation; represented 
in public office by those whose very elections were dependent 
on their promises to white voters to double and redouble his 
disabilities; forced to scrounge and cadge for education; 
segregated in every phase of life;  . . .  with no place to turn for 
redress of his grievances except to the Court that had approved 
the devices used to reduce him to his helpless and almost 
hopeless degradation. I I 
In the Slaughter House Cases, Justice Samuel F. Miller, speaking for the 
majority, emphasized that the 14th Amendment was not intended to change the 
federal system by bringing civil rights under the purview of national citizenship. 
This case relegated the fundamental rights of African Americans to the white 
supremacists in the states rights area of the American South. 
The culmination of Slaughter House and the cases that followed was in Plessy 
v. Ferguson (1896).12 In this case the legal principle of "separate but equal" was 
established. The Court stated that law is just when it follows "the established 
usages, customs and traditions of the people." The Southern custom of working 
Negroes with the lash, the tradition of segregating them in inferior and unhealthy 
domiciles, and the use of lynch law to break the spirit of black resistance were 
consistent with northern interests at this point in time, for the North was 
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hard at work building railroads, spawning corporations, 
winning the West, creating great fortunes, welcoming hordes 
of immigrants from Europe to do the necessary labor-and 
quite willing to resign the Negro to the tender mercies of the 
South.13 
The case demonstrates that the ideology of race and legal discourse combined 
to explain how the status quo of white supremacy and black subserviency would 
be maintained by rule oflaw. Rule oflaw would help the Southerners coerce their 
labor force into submission, for the purpose of exploiting it to meet the material 
interests of those who controlled the "lengthening shadow of slavery." This case 
and other labor-related peonage cases helped solidify the material basis of a 
structure of social relations that was based on white supremacy . 14 The develop­
ment of the NAACP' s  campaign to overturn these racialistic case decisions in the 
early twentieth century indicated that "separate but equal" was an ideological 
form that helped to contour social relations but could not act hegemonic ally to 
obscure its racist reality. Justice Harlan, who dissented in the Plessy case, said 
it best: "The thin disguise of equal accommodations for passengers . . .  will not 
mislead anyone nor atone for the wrong this day done ." 1 5  Gramscian hegemony 
did not lessen nor dilute social antagonisms, nor did it assure people, black 
people, that their particular interests, such as freedom and equality, should be 
subordinated to the collective and immoral judgments of a white supremacist 
society. This society and particular classes within had their hands on the controls 
of the clear-eyed sensate machine of law. The type of racist society legitimized 
by the US Supreme Court was totally unacceptable to Americans of minority 
ethnicity (African Americans, Chicanos-Latinos, Native Americans, and those 
of Asiatic origins). Their respective mass movements of resistance demonstrated 
a deep disenchantment with an America predicated on racist ideology and racist 
law. I6 
The coercive dimensions of law, rarely discussed in conjunction with law ' s  
ideological force, became a prominent, primary, and public weapon in breaking 
the back of black labor' s  resistance. Between 1889 and 1 922, approximately 
3436 people were lynched in this country, the majority of whom were "recalci­
trant Negroes." 17 "Judge Lynch" delegitimized whatever was left of the law ' s  
mask o f  ritual, magic, and truth. The popular form o f  the ideology o f  race that was 
not so subtly hidden in legal discourse was expressed by such American 
luminaries as Thomas Dixon, Governor James Vardaman of Mississippi, and 
Senator Ben Tillman of South Carolina. The novelist Dixon (the 1 9 1 5  movie 
Birth afa Nation was based on his writings) noted, "My deliberate opinion of the 
negro is that he is not worth hell-room. If I were the devil I would not let him in 
hell. ... " On another occasion Dixon thundered: "Education! Can you change 
the color of [his] skin, the kink of his hair, the bulge of his lips, the spread of his 
nose, or the beat of his heart with a spelling book? The negro is a human donkey."  
Governor Vardaman continued by emphasizing that "I  am opposed to  Negro 
voting [and] it matters not what his advertised moral and mental qualifications 
may be. I am just as opposed to Booker T. Washington as a voter, with all of his 
Anglo-Saxon reinforcements, as I am to the coconut-headed, chocolate-colored 
typical little coon Andy Dotson, who blacks my shoes every morning. Neither 
is fit to perform the supreme function of citizenship." Senator Tillman closed this 
circle of thought by crying out: "Money spent for the maintenance of public 
schools for Negroes is robbery of the white man and a waste upon negroes .  It does 
him no good, but it does him harm."1 8 
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It was this ideological, institutional, and historical milieu that the first 
Chinese faced when they arrived in Mississippi between 1869 and 1877. 
Southern planters recruited "coolie" labor as an alternative to recalcitrant black 
labor imbued with the independent air of freedom and equality. The Vicksburg 
Times confirmed this recruitment rationale by arguing that "Emancipation has 
spoiled the negro, and carried him away from fields of agriculture. Our prosperity 
depends entirely upon the recovery of lost ground, and we therefore say let the 
Coolies come, and we will take the chance of Christianizing them."19  In further 
analyzing planter motivation, Powell Clayton, Governor of Arkansas, noted that 
"Undoubtedly the underlying motive for this effort to bring in Chinese laborers 
was to punish the negro for having abandoned the control from his old master, 
and to regulate the conditions of his employment and the scales of wages to be 
paid him. "2 0 
The importation of Chinese into the American South was consistent with the 
importation of Chinese labor into the plantation system of the West Indies after 
abolition. Both regional ruling classes were suspicious as to whether the ex-slave 
would work without the "benefit" of the lash. Chinese labor came into a type of 
social relations in which its status and the ideology of that status were 
predetermined by the traditions, customs, and institutional usages of three 
hundred years of black and white relationships.  Because of this salient fact, the 
development of Chinese life in the Mississippi Delta would be contoured by the 
proper relationships between predetermined superior and inferior "races." 
The period in which the Chinese were used as replacement labor, with a legal 
status comparable to the freedman, was brief. With the Compromise of 1 877, 
Southern planters stopped the deliberate recruitment of coolie labor. Black 
resistance was broken by constitutional law and by lynch law, embodied in such 
terrorist groups as the Ku Klux Klan, the White Line, and the Knights of the 
White Camelias. But before the planters returned to blacks as a basis for their 
laboring class, it was obvious that some planters were quite pleased with coolie 
labor. In 1 870, the Bolivar Times reported that "Messrs. Ferris and Estell, who 
are cultivating on the Hughs place, near Prentiss, recently imported direct from 
Hong Knog, a lot of Chinese, sixteen in number, with whom as laborers, they are 
well pleased."2 1  By 1880, the US census listed approximately fifty-one Chinese 
in Mississippi. In 1 900, this number had grown to 183 and in 1 920, to 322. The 
majority of these Chinese came from the "Sze Yap or Four Counties district 
southwest of Canton in South China . . . .  "22 
The "Redemption" of the Southern states by the planter class and the 
implementation of the old social relations of black and white, coupled with the 
infamous "Mississippi Plan of 1890" (which led to the rise of de jure Jim Crow), 
left the Chinese as the odd man out. However, coming from an area of China with 
strong entrepreneurial values, these Chinese began to successfully carve out a 
niche between black and white in both the social and economic structures of the 
"New South." Because of the racist aversion to doing business with "Negroes," 
the Chinese were able to develop and dominate the grocery store business that 
sold commodities to blacks. Other ethnics, Italians and Jews, were also permitted 
to carve out their niche in selling to the blacks. Referring to this aversion, one 
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white businessman said of whites who have stores oriented to selling to blacks, 
"Nobody condemns them for it, but we don't  invite 'em to our homes and our 
social life . . . .  "23 Another similar comment was: "Occasionally you find a white 
merchant down there, but they 're usually either a dago or a Jew."24 Another 
reason why the Chinese were able to establish and dominate the trade with 
"Negroes" was because they specified their market by locating in black areas and 
they interacted with their consumers with courtesy and respect. As one black 
customer stated, "They [Chinese grocers] don 't worry the hell out of you about 
saying 'Mr. ' or anything."25 
As these Chinese businessmen prospered, by frugal self-denial, they began to 
build communities by smuggling in Chinese women, which was against US 
immigration law, by importing "merchant wives," which was legal, or by 
cohabitating with a "negro woman." It is interesting that Mrs . Gong Lum was 
described as an educated lady from Hong Kong-most likely a merchant wife 
import.2 6 
This small community attempted by their lifestyle, their acceptance of Jim 
Crow, and their conversion to Christianity and starting of churches, to elevate 
themselves further up the social ladder. But because their status had been 
historically predetermined, they would remain at the level of interstitiality or 
worse. One Chinese could assert that, "Before 1942, the Chinese had no status 
in Mississippi whatever. They were considered on the same status as the Negro . 
. . . "27 It is quite obvious that the Mississippi Chinese maintained their existence 
as a marginal, isolated community from the whites and did little mixing with 
"Negroes" outside of the business relation. 
The interstitial marginality was acceptable as long as the Chinese community 
was composed of single men or their status did not legally appear to be similar 
to the blacks. All this changed when the Chinese community developed a family 
base and the community 'S aspirations for its children rose above the status quo. 
The Gong Lum case sprang from this changing community and the Chinese 
view ofthemselves vis-a-vis the whites and the blacks. In the fall of 1 924, Martha 
Gong Lum, daughter of a prosperous Chinese grocer, was first admitted to a 
white school and then, at "noon recess," asked to leave by the Rosedale 
Consolidated High School trustees. Financially able to hire lawyers from an 
established law firm, Mr. Gong Lum, through his lawyers, argued that the Plessy 
dictum should be maintained by admitting Martha to the white school since "She 
is not a member of the colored race nor is she of mixed blood . . .  "2 8 and because 
the state of Mississippi had not established a school for Chinese children under 
the separate but equal dictum. Victorious at the circuit court level, the Gong 
Lums and their lawyers had to face the school trustees ' appeal to the state 
supreme court, where they lost. The Mississippi Supreme Court stated 
categorically that "Chinese are not white and must fall under the heading, colored 
races ."2 9 The Court relegated Martha to the separate but unequal school for 
"Negroes." 
On appeal to the US Supreme Court, the Gong Lum lawyers took an ingenious 
tack in their argument. Recognizing the convergence of law, race, and ethnicity, 
the lawyers used the logic of the racialistic legal discourse that the US Supreme 
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Court had developed since the Slaughter House Cases. Their arguments bring 
validity to critical legal theory in several ways but, by the mere fact that Mr. Gong 
Lum saw law as partially unjust, reject other assumptions of the theory. The 
lawyers asserted that the whites make the law in their image and interest. The 
image is the white supremacist world view, and their interest is the maintenance 
of their racial domination, in part by establishing superior schools for whites and 
inferior schools for blacks. The lawyers then argued that the Chinese should be 
included in the social order at a level commensurate with their non-Negro status 
and their economic level. The lawyers argued that "If there is danger in the 
association [with Negroes] , it is a danger from which one race is entitled to 
protection just the same as another . . . .  The white race creates for itself a privilege 
that it denies to other races; exposes the children of their races to risk and dangers 
to which it would not expose its own children. This is discrimination. "30 This was 
an intriguing argument that came close to validating Gramscian hegemony 
theory in accepting white supremacist assumptions about legal relationships; 
however, the Court rejected this argument and sent a non-hegemonic message to 
the Gong Lums: If you live in the South, then you fall under the Mississippi 
"policy of the lawmakers . . .  to preserve the white schools for members of the 
Caucasian race alone." 
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Taft referred to other post-Compromise 
of 1 877 cases. The Court cited over twenty state and federal cases beginning in 
1 849 and concluding in 1896 that upheld the power of the states to impose 
various types of segregation on the "colored races." Obviously peeved or just 
plain bored with such cases in controversy, he noted, 
Were this a new question, it would call for very full argument 
and consideration, but we think that it is the same question 
which has many times decided to be within the constitutional 
power of the state legislature to settle without intervention of 
the federal courts under the Federal Constitution. 
What is most intriguing about Taft ' s  reasoning is that he attempted to support 
this entire racialistic artifice by analogous logic. He cited the 1849 case of 
Roberts v. City of Boston, which upheld the separation of colored and white 
schools .  Taft inferred that if white Northerners, the supposed friends of the 
"Negro," can rightly segregate them, then why not his "enemies"? Taft noted: 
Similar laws have been enacted by Congress under its general 
power of legislation over the District of Columbia as well as 
by the legislatures of many of the States, and have been 
generally, if not unifornlly, sustained by the Courts . . .  
Furthermore, Taft stated that these cases 
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arose, it is true, over the establishment of separate schools as 
between white pupils and black pupils, but we can not think 
that the question is any different or that any different result can 
be reached, assuming the cases above cited to be rightly 
decided, where the issue is as between white pupils and the 
pupils of the yellow races. 
In referring to P/essy as one of those cases rightly decided, Chief Justice Taft 
was promoting the majority decision in Plessy that 
every exercise of the police power must be reasonable and 
extend only to such laws as are enacted in good faith for the 
promotion of the public good, and not for the annoyance or 
oppression of a particular class. 
Neither Justice Henry Billings Brown in 1896 nor Taft in 1927 understood the 
obvious, as stated by Plessy's lone dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, "that 
the statute in question had its origin in the purpose . . .  to exclude colored people . 
. . . " Mr. Gong Lum'  s lawyers affirmed Harlan' s  correct perception by emphasizing 
the "annoyance or oppression" was aimed directly at Chinese American citizens. 
As for equal facilities, the Taft Court had to just look at the material 
underpinnings on which the statute rested to see the vast and deep inferiority of 
"Negro" schools. Separate but unequal schooling was reflected in the disparity 
in expenditures the school board allotted for white versus colored schools. As 
early as 1912, Southern states were spending less than $2.00 per colored student 
while spending around $15.00 per white student.3! 
The Taft Court continued by laying to rest the issues of federalism by citing 
Harlan ' s  decision in Cumming v. Richmond County Board ofEducation.32 This 
was a case concerning the power of a local school board to close down a colored 
school, because of a budget shortfall, while maintaining a school for white 
children. Harlan decided 
the education of the people in schools maintained by state 
taxation is a matter belonging to the respective States,  and any 
interference on the part of Federal authority with the 
management of such schools can not be justified . . . .  
In citing this case, the Court argued that "the right and power of the state to 
regulate the method of providing for the education of its youth at public expense 
is clear." The Taft Court ' s  insistence on supporting local autonomy at the 
expense of black rights was certainly in keeping with the infamous Compromise 
of 1877. Settling the "Negro Question" was more important than giving the 
"brown, yellow or black races" a truly equal protection of the laws. 
By affirming the Mississippi Supreme Court ' s  decision, the Taft Court agreed 
that Mr. Gong Lum could "educate his child in a private school if he so desires. 
But the plaintiff is not entitled to attend a white public school." This agreement 
reveals how legal ideological discourse affirms a certain reality-that Chinese 
grocers had achieved a comfortable class status which was so recognized by the 
Court ' s  decision. The discourse then attempts to obscure the inequality of "free 
choice" by not addressing the substantive quality of such private schools and the 
social stigma attached. As Justice Brown noted in Plessy, if whites think that the 
colored races are inferior and should be segregated, then "law cannot change 
custom." Obviously, Brown could not, nor would not, concede that legal 
legitimacy would help mold the consciousness of segregationist whites to make 
them feel that they were doing the right thing. The law 's  ideology could and did 
legitimize the material interests , as expressed via the structure of separate 
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schools, of those whites who supplicated ever so successfully before the US 
Supreme Court. 
However, with the loss of this case, and in refutation of the theory of 
hegemony, the Gong Lums and other Chinese families either left the state of 
Mississippi or the South entirely. Others brought in Chinese teachers from 
California and started their own "resistance school" (Chinese Baptist Mission 
School). The county assisted by hiring two white school teachers to aid in this 
separation)3 Social tensions remained high and bitterness continued for many 
years. The decision did not assure the Mississippi Chinese that their interest 
should be subordinated to the "collective judgments" of white society. The 
ideological discourse of law did not convince the Chinese that social antagonism 
would lessen. The Chinese felt antagonism toward them would be increased as 
they were lumped into a group that had received the brunt of legalized violence. 
This examination of Gong Lum v. Rice reveals what is promising about 
critical legal theory and also its dead end when it is applied to racialistic law as 
it developed in this country between 1872 and 1927. Federalism and equal 
protection of the laws as legal ideological constructs were contoured to meet the 
exigencies of race and politics during this period. Racism as a dominant cultural 
and political world view of both Northern and Southern ruling classes was 
expressed through legal doctrine to legitimize and support the material interest 
of these classes. The North was able to set aside the volatile "Negro Question" 
which had so enthralled and bogged down national political direction since the 
Civil War. Northern interest in developing a strong unified national economy 
and the Southern need to regain control over a disenchanted and radicalized labor 
force led to the Compromise of 1877. This Compromise received a legal and 
Constitutional salutation in a series of Supreme Court cases that intertwined legal 
discourse and racism. This salutation culminated in the "separate but equal" 
doctrine in 1896. 
The promise of critical legal theory is somewhat confirmed if one sees the 
consensus of racism structuring white mass consciousness and social relations 
while obscuring the inherent inequality of these relations to the whites themselves. 
The dead end, of course, is that the inequality of legal doctrine was obvious to 
the various racial minorities who challenged racialistic law. One can also argue 
the promise of hegemonic theory by seeing that these racial minorities used law, 
specifically separate but equal doctrine, to support their legal complaint. 
The flaw in this line of thinking is that Mr. Gong Lum, et aI. ,  were merely 
using the doctrine tactically and never permitted its verbal "fig-leaves" to 
obscure the reality of racial discrimination and oppression as they assessed their 
own material condition and the broader set of social relations in the "New South." 
Critical legal theory can help legal scholars in their examination of American 
legal history. This paper demonstrates that the theory has to be severely adjusted 
when it is applied to the history of race relations law. American law and its 
brethren, Judge Lynch and Lynch Law, have consistently revealed to America ' s  
racial minorities the illegitimacy oflaw, its ideologies offaimess and justice, and 
its functionaries. Brown v. Board of Education,34 which overturned Gong Lum , 
is remembered today, by many critics ,  as the first time that the Supreme Court 
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had recognized a constitutional right and then denied it "with all deliberate 
speed." The 199 1 confirmation of African American conservative Clarence 
Thomas to the Supreme Court will not ensure a different type of fairness, nor 
justice, in the legal remedies held out to minorities. Inversely, his presence, for 
those who are very much ahistorical, will legitimate the illusion of justice which 
is legal hegemony's purpose. The appeal for legal relief by racial minorities has 
more to do with their understanding of the law's coercive dimension if they take 
their grievances to the "proverbial" streets than with a belief by these minorities 
that the oracle of law is magical, objectively ritualistic,  and serves truth. Racially 
oppressed minorities, more so than other Americans, understood and understand 
the ideological masks and contradictions inherent in the law, as expressed by 
O.W. Holmes who suggested, in his Common Law ( 1880), that the felt necessi­
ties of the time or the prejudices of men determined the paths of law rather than 
syllogistic logic.35 The Gong Lum v. Rice decision reflects this observation and, 
in its insistence on a racialistic, federally protected "equality," reveals a much 
deeper revelation as expressed by Anatole France: 
The law in its majestic impartiality forbids rich and poor alike 
to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets , and steal bread.36 
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Critique 
Law in the United States may of course be viewed through a number of 
different perspectives. Over the past several decades, racial minorities have used 
litigation and legislation to reform institutional policies and practices, and this 
has given impetus to perspectives of law as a significant tool of constructive 
social change. While such frameworks have validity, Malik Simba's paper is a 
relevant reminder of the ideological and coercive dimensions of law and of its 
long history as a means of oppressing racial minorities. 
Simba presents critical legal theory as a fairly straightforward perspective 
that sees law as an ideological form which reflects the material interests of the 
dominant classes and helps structure society and its material base but at the same 
time obscuring this and performing a hegemonic function to lessen social 
antagonisms. Simba effectively uses this interpretation to describe the role of law 
in solidifying white supremacy in the post- Civil War South and to examine the 
theory's utility through the case of Gong Lum v. Rice. 
Critical legal theory clearly has promise for the historical analysis of race 
relations law, though its basic concepts have broad meanings and implications 
and may require some specification before they can be applied to other situations. 
Also, as Simba correctly points out, critical legal theory has a serious shortcom­
ing. Legal institutions have not functioned to veil inequality and injustice from 
racial minorities. Therefore, adjustments to critical theory must be made before 
this perspective can be applied to other circumstances. 
Simba argues that, by the time of the Gong Lum case, the Chinese in 
Mississippi had achieved a marginal, interstitial status between the blacks and 
the whites. This is an area that requires further analysis because it may reveal 
another problem with critical legal theory. Sociologist Robert Quan contends 
that the Chinese were moving toward the creation of a triracial society. At the 
time of the Gong Lum case, they had achieved the first steps in this process 
through the immigration of wives and intact families, their conversion to 
Christianity, and the economic foundation of their grocery stores. This process 
was aided by the whites, who, for example, taught the Chinese the English 
language, American values, and Southern Baptist religion. 1 More needs to be 
known about the extent of white assistance and the nature of the emerging 
triracial society. But the whites clearly benefited from the latter. The triracial 
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